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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TELLING A CONSTITUTIONAL STORY: EXAMPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE

LISA A. KLOPPENBERG*
Most of us teach Constitutional Law because we love it. We are fascinated
by the history, the politics, the institutional clashes, and the public values in
this arena. It should be easy to share our passion for constitutional law with
future lawyers, some of whom will become the next leaders of government and
business, shaping our country, with a tremendous impact on the world.
Yet, even in Constitutional Law, we can find it difficult to inspire our
students, to engage them fully in our beloved topic. Many things compete for
our students’ attention: a wide range of legal subjects; jobs, families and other
time demands; and vast amounts of information inundating them continuously,
particularly through the internet and a range of media. Many of us find that
our students are not familiar with major events that shaped constitutional law,
including important historical and social events of the past fifty years. These
catalysts are meaningful to us; indeed, many of us are personally connected to
them. Few students are invested—politically, emotionally or personally—in
these developments. Be it the Cold War, the civil rights movement of the
1960s, feminist struggles of the 1970s, or the resurgence of federalism more
recently, it is all rather removed history for many of our students. Not
surprisingly, they find it hard to absorb how political, social, economic, and
other catalysts relate to the major constitutional law decisions they study.
Some of this disconnect is attributable to the generational differences
encountered by all professors. However, I believe the disconnect is
exacerbated by the snippet-sized, instantaneous focus of current information
gathering and reporting, as well as the sheer amount of information our
students have absorbed during their lifetimes. When we teach Constitutional
Law, we have a particular obligation to bridge this gulf. Social, political, and
historical context shapes the development of constitutional law. A student can
learn Civil Procedure, ADR, or even Professional Ethics well with only a
glimpse of the past: a passing knowledge of common law pleading, colonial
arbitral practices, or the precursors to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Many courses focus on the present statutory scheme for good reason.
While a student can certainly benefit from history to understand the reasons for
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law.
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rule changes and to anticipate likely future challenges, teaching my students to
contextualize the material is not as pressing when I teach those courses as
when I teach Constitutional Law.
A research assistant, whom I hired because she excelled on my
Constitutional Law exam, once confided that students resented the heavy
reading I assigned in Constitutional Law and the fact that we concentrated on
“note” cases more than usual. Later, she and some of her peers realized that
they had learned constitutional law principles effectively because we discussed
the note cases and thus put the major decisions into a political, social, historical
and legal context. As my student wisely said, “[t]he law, like history, is a story
to be told, and the best stories are told from cover to cover, not climax to
climax.”1
The note cases help put everything in context. They help create the
constitutional story, which often involves a dialogue among a variety of
constitutional interpreters. Everything is not resolved by a landmark decision
of the Supreme Court. Issues often must be ironed out over time and in
response to a variety of events. For example, after a major constitutional
ruling, executive branch officials interpret the Court’s decisions, legislatures
generate new laws on the topic, people may vote for a referendum on the topic
or a related issue, and other courts (state and lower federal courts) interpret the
Court’s ruling. Pendulum swings are not uncommon in the areas we cover.
We can help our students see the ebb and flow of constitutional law and
understand better its contours and potential future currents if we use examples
of constitutional dialogue to teach the doctrine.
Constitutional dialogue encompasses a range of activity, from sudden,
outright political resistance to a Court ruling to intertwined, subtle
developments over time involving economic conditions, social attitudes, and
political forces. Constitutional law often develops due to the interplay of Court
decisions, resistance and implementation by other branches or political
subdivisions, subsequent changes in the law, and lower court rulings that allow
an issue to percolate up to the Court in a new factual or legal context. Of
course, the Court has many mechanisms to choose from in deciding when and
how to address a constitutional issue. It may avoid deciding—or further
extrapolating upon—the merits of an issue for a host of reasons, including a
desire to avoid controversial, divisive matters, or a desire to defer to other
constitutional actors or allow further constitutional dialogue to occur.2

1. Interview with Betsy West Suver, Student, University of Dayton School of Law Class of
2005, in Dayton, Ohio (Nov. 2004).
2. See generally LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW (2001) (discussing the
avoidance doctrine and constitutional dialogue examples).
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Let me give two examples of how context informs my teaching in
Constitutional Law. For a few years, I used the wonderful text by Daniel
Farber, Bill Eskridge, and Phil Frickey, in large part because an early chapter
focused on a case study of Brown v. Board of Education3 to demonstrate
constitutional decision making.4 The case study begins with the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, canvasses the cases leading up to the challenges
addressed by the Court in the 1950s, and examines later cases on school
desegregation, asking whether Brown made a positive difference. The study
does not only include Supreme Court cases. Congressional activity and the
activity of other constitutional actors is mentioned; empirical integration data
are cited.
To inform our discussion of Brown, I also read to students an excerpt from
one of Judge Abner Mikva’s articles.5 The article describes Justice Felix
Frankfurter’s reasoning for delaying decision by the Court in one of the
precursors to Brown because 1952 was an election year.6 Some students are
repelled by Frankfurter’s direct reference to politics affecting the timing of this
landmark Equal Protection ruling; for many, it makes the socially divisive
context surrounding Brown come alive.
Even dense, difficult cases are often accompanied by a lively political
battle that may engage the students. In teaching standing principles, many
cover Allen v. Wright.7 It can be presented as a case challenging IRS policies,
with a focus on the basic elements of standing. Certainly, students need to
understand that doctrine. By supplying some background information on the
growth of “segregation academies” and the showdown between Congress and
the executive branch over the tax regulations, students grasp better the
reasoning behind the Court’s expansion of existing standing principles in
Allen.8 They will be equipped to apply standing principles to future disputes
with a more sophisticated understanding of the “socially sensitive issues” and
political battle animating that landmark decision.9
Federalism decisions are another area where it is helpful to bring in
context, including the battles between states and Indian tribes reflected by

3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY (3d ed. 2003).
5. Abner J. Mikva, The Role of Theorists in Constitutional Cases, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 451
(1992).
6. Id. at 454–55.
7. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
8. See generally KLOPPENBERG, supra note 2, at 75.
9. See id. at 75–83. Chapter 3 contains a discussion of how the Court has developed
heightened standing requirements in recent decades in a number of racially charged controversies.
Id. at 67–92.
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cases such as Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.10 When we study
substantive due process, I give students a bit of background on the
Progressives, the New Deal, and economic and political currents leading up to
Lochner v. New York.11 By the end of the semester, it becomes a joke between
us, as I frequently refer back to Lochner when I seek arguments about the
appropriate role of the Court. Because the students know a bit about the
history, politics, and social currents surrounding Lochner, they understand my
passion for calling upon it to analyze recent Court decisions. Another former
student said: “While you gave history and the evolution of the Court its due
consideration, you also demanded that we critically approach the Court’s
decisions—not just with regard to mechanics and analysis but perhaps more
importantly as to whether the Court had done the right thing. Your approach
went a long way towards de-mystifing the Court and subject as a whole.”12
My contextualized teaching is informed in part by my scholarship on
avoidance and constitutional dialogue. The other driver is the example
provided by outstanding constitutional law professors and scholars, including
two whom I was extremely fortunate to experience in the classroom. Erwin
Chemerinsky excelled at combining coverage and depth. He made sure we
understood the doctrine we needed to know for the bar examination and for the
constitutional issues a handful of us might encounter in law practice. But his
course made a tremendous impact on me because he never shied away from the
controversial facts often underlying constitutional decisions—including race,
gender, and poverty issues. His eye for the marginalized helped us
comprehend some of the important context surrounding the development of
various constitutional doctrines. John Jeffries taught me many constitutional
issues in Federal Courts. He was a master at emphasizing the role of courts,
including the Supreme Court, vis-a-vis other branches. He took potentially dry
subjects and enlivened them with note cases and references to the political
interchange informing the Court’s positions. Yet he never used the context as
an excuse to let us slide by on the tough analytical issues as we discussed the
application of standing, abstention, and other doctrines. Others have praised
Bert Wechsler, Jim Ellis, Allen Sultan and Rich Saphire. They made history
come alive, creating some lawyers who are devoted to reading history or
political science works as a hobby. Some of them helped students see the

10. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. E-mail from David Hayes, Student, University of Dayton School of Law, to Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, Dean and Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law (Dec. 6, 2004)
(on file with author).
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current relevance of constitutional law by supplying news clippings, proposed
legislation, and editorials.13
The great difficulty in bringing more context to bear in teaching
Constitutional Law is how to balance the history and politics with the modern
doctrine they need to know to be well-prepared for the bar and represent
clients. We must cover an incredible amount of material in a compressed time
period. Just a glance at the size of constitutional textbooks demonstrates the
growing amount of material many professors consider critical. We need to cut
material each year to fit in new cases or developments (e.g., new legislation on
security, cybercrime, or pornography). If students do not feel they are learning
useful material, many will disengage. Thus, too much focus on the Framers or
the Red Scare can turn the course into an undergraduate political science
course. If these topics resonate with our areas of research, we may hold
fascinating discussions with a few students but will lose the majority and breed
significant resentment. While students may not fully realize the value of our
teaching methods until well after they fill out our evaluations and take their
examinations, if we are not reaching most of our students, we are not
performing our jobs effectively.
Constitutional Law professors know we are fortunate. People—including
our students—are often more interested in discussing current constitutional
controversies than the intricacies of the bankruptcy or tax codes (even given
fascinating policy issues surrounding those topics). We teach courses many of
our colleagues would like to teach. It is still not easy to “break into” the
Constitutional Law “lineup” at many law schools. Unlike Professional
Responsibility, Constitutional Law is a course not lightly given up, in part
because it is an area of scholarly concentration for many American law
professors. It is a gift to teach this important, dynamic subject. In turn,
whatever we can do to keep the next generation of leaders impassioned about
constitutional law in its broad, rich, contextualized sense is a wonderful
contribution to our profession and the world.

13. Interviews with Mark Zunich, American University Washington College of Law, Class
of 1992, and Lloyd Spencer, University of Dayton School of Law, Class of 1990 (Nov. and Dec.
2004).
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